Before setting out on my first tour of Saigon, I spoke with Tony. During the Vietnam War, Tony served with the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) as a translator.  For part of the war, he served with an American tank crew.  During one engagement with the Viet Cong (VC), Tony was gravely wounded in the jaw. Tony credits an anonymous U.S. surgeon for having saved his life, for he believes he would have died waiting at a South Vietnamese hospital. Moreover, Tony says he received many vaccinations and has not been sick since his encounter with American medical care. As a result of the actions of his American comrades and the surgeon, Tony has the utmost respect for Americans and their medicine. After the U.S. began to drastically reduces its military footprint in South Vietnam, a process known as Vietnamization, Tony told me of the biggest decision of his life.  When the war ultimately turned against the South Vietnamese, Tony said his commander informed him that he could either continue fighting or find a way to remain with his family. Knowing that if he staying the field odds where he would never return, he decided to render himself unfit for military service. Tony amputated his index finger on his right hand, thus preventing him from properly operating a rifle. For Tony, this extreme action kept him alive and able to enjoy family life. Tony’s story is one of the most extreme I have ever heard and one that I always remember. Another fascinating facet of Tony is his persistent belief in the Republic of Vietnam. Throughout our time in the Saigon area, he proudly talked about his time in the ARVN and U.S. commendations. For me, Tony is living proof that people truly believed in South Vietnam.

Path at Pete's ambush site - Photo courtesy of Anna Rikki Nelson

30 meters away from VC machine-gun nest at Pete's ambush site - Photo courtesy of Anna Rikki Nelson

Since the program centered on taking back Pete Edwards, a U.S. Army veteran of the Vietnam War, to Vietnam for the first time since the conflict, one of the most significant moments of the trip was seeing the ambush site infamously recounted in David Marnaniss’s They Marched Into Sunlight (Pete signed my copy before the trip ended). North of Lai Khe in Binh Long province, in an area once called the Long Ngyuyen Secret Zone Near, Pete’s life change forever. On a path cutting through acres of rubber trees, near the site of the Michelin rubber plantation, the group came across the area were Pete, then a Second Lieutenant and platoon leader in the 2/28 Black Lions, lost a lot of good men to a VC machine-gun nest. During our time at the site, Pete explained the ambush. After struggling with a number of jammed M-16′s, Pete finally found a functioning weapon and killed the machine-gunner. Later, Pete said he regretted not being able to lead all of his men off the battlefield. This was probably Pete’s most emotional moment of the trip, and one I will never forget. After a few photographs we paid our respects and left flowers.

After leaving the ambush site, the group drove a few miles to a field that was once a thriving U.S. Army base at Lai Khe.  During his first tour, Pete called this base home. After the war ended, the Vietnamese removed all traces of the base. The Vietnamese plowed under what remained of the American base, leaving an open field.  Postwar maps bear no markings for a Ben Cat in Binh Long province.  While the base no longer exists, a few small dwellings and dirt roads remain. Pete pointed out a hut once know for its various “services.” Along a dirt road near the creek, Pete located the site of his tent. Pete remarked that he could still picture the base bustling with men and helicopters.

Pete and Tony at My Tho

During our day at the Mekong Delta, the grouped saw the local Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) command center at My Tho. During Pete’s second tour, he served as an advisor to a South Vietnamese military unit. Since the MACV installation is now a Vietnamese Army base we were unable to tour the facilities or take any photographs. Nevertheless, we walked around the town and saw the areas where Pete had manned checkpoints.

During our time in Saigon, Pete and Tony developed a close bond.  Both men had fought the same enemy and bore the wounds of battle. Before the Saigon portion of our trip ended, Pete gave Tony a Combat Infantryman Badge. A badge identical to one Pete wore throughout the trip.

Before our time in Saigon ended, the group witnessed a meeting of former enemies. At the Vietnamese equivalent of a VFW, Pete met a retired North Vietnamese Army (NVA) colonel and two former members of the VC.  Tony, and ARVN veteran, completed this group. During the war with America, the NVA veteran helped supply and prepare VC cadres for their assault on Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The NVA veteran not only fought the Americans. Before the American War, he fought with the Viet Minh against the French at Dien Bien Phu.  He spent about eight to ten years in Cambodia fighting the Khmer Rouge and, later, their Chinese allies. This 82-year-old man had participated in the major events that produced the modern nation of Vietnam. Due to his decades of service, the NVA veteran proudly wore a metal that basically allowed him to do whatever he wanted. He gave this medal to Pete.

Five veterans of the Vietnam War. From left to right: ARVN, NVA, U.S. Army, VC, VC.

The two VC veterans were man and wife. During the war, they met and served together at the Cu Chi Tunnels. The wife spent her time as a nurse in the tunnels, where one learned “on the spot.” After telling us about her role in the VC, she serenaded us with patriotic wartime songs. Besides tending to their physical wounds, the nurses sought to lighten the mood and cheer-up wounded soldiers. Speaking of wounds, the nurse’s husband lost his right leg to an American claymore mine. The couple had a son during their tunnel days, so it is safe to say that people tried their best to live fairly normal lives underground.

Despite all their hardships and scars, none of the veterans displayed any ill will or resentment towards one another. It is true when the Vietnamese people tell you that they left their anger and resentment in the past and now is a time for former enemies to move forward as friends. After witnessing Pete’s experiences, I would love nothing more than to participate in another veterans return to Vietnam.

As always, view the photos while you wait for the next post. The next post will discuss the memorialization of Vietnam’s war dead.

The trip began with a long flight from New Orleans to Atlanta to Seoul to Ho Chi Minh City. Arriving in Ho Chi Minh City was everything I anticipated. As the Korean Air jet landed at Tan Son Nhat International Airport, I saw the old U.S. Air Force hangers. Odds are those hangers are full of MiGs and not Thunderchiefs. Later on during the trip I saw similar hangers full of Russian fighter jets at Da Nang and Hanoi. As anticipated, sweating commenced as soon as I existed the airport.

Reunification Palace

Reunification Palace

My first day in Saigon included a visit to the Reunification Palace. As seen in Vietnam War-era news reports, the interior of  Palace retains its green carpets and woodwork. It did not take much to vision Ngo Dinh Diem sitting in one of the rooms with an U.S. official seating by his side. The tour consisted of seeing the main rooms and the extensive network of command facilities. The Palace is complete with offices for the President and the Vice-President, military command rooms, various conference and reception, dinning facilities, living quarters for the President and family, and entertainment (dance floor and theater). Located on the Palace grounds are the two NVA tanks that breached the Palace gates back in 1975. This place is a must see for all scholars and students of the Vietnam War.

Cu Chi Tunnels

One of many Cu Chi Tunnel entrances

The group spent the better part of a day visiting the famous Cu Chi Tunnels. Located approximately 30 miles outside on Saigon near the Saigon River, the Cu Chi Tunnels made the Iron Triangle infamous among American military personnel. During the French and American wars, this sprawling underground network of tunnels housed the living quarters, kitchens, hospitals, command centers, and stockpiles of weaponry for thousands of Viet Minh, and later, Viet Cong (VC) fighters. Entire families lived within the tunnels.  For much of America’s war with Vietnam, U.S. forces never destroyed the Cu Chi Tunnels. U.S. attempts to use dogs to sniff-out VC and tunnel entrances resulted in the lose of many K9s. Today, families of VC Cu Chi Tunnel veterans display to golden German shepherds outside of their homes to tell passersby that their family member survived. It is estimated the while about 280 American soldiers lost their lives at the tunnels, over 50,000 VC combatants died.

Da Nang’s Vietnam War Sites

Da Nang Hangers

Much like the airport at Saigon, Da Nang’s airport still exhibited traces of its time as a U.S. installation. The concrete hangers typical of the Vietnam War, still line a part of the runway. While in Da Nang, I was able to catch a glimpse of a once sprawling American helicopter base. It is hard to visit these former bases since most are now Vietnamese Army barracks and it is illegal to photograph such places. Nevertheless, I was able to snap a few pictures from the highway. As far as military history goes, visiting the China and Red Beaches makes for a nearly complete trip to Da Nang. Consequently I did not hesitate to see the Red Beach were the first detachment of U.S. Marines landed. Also not to be missed was China Beach, where many U.S. personal spent time on R&R.

Hue Citadel

Hue Citadel ruins

My time in Hue began with a tour of the Citadel. Knowing full well that American forces were forbidden from attacking historical treasures, during the 1968 Tet Offensive VC cadres infested the Citadel. After much debate and pressure, the South Vietnamese authorities allowed the U.S. to bomb and use heavy artillery on the Citadel complex. Aside from the massive amount of ordnance dropped on the Citadel, intense fighting occurred within the fortification’s walls. As a result, much of the complex was destroyed. The massive exterior walls remain (with shell holes) and only a handful of buildings survive. Most of the existing buildings are located near the main gate.  An ongoing project of the Vietnamese government is the rebuilding and restoring of the Citadel complex. The endeavor is far from complete.

Khe Sanh

Ever since I signed-up for the Vietnam trip, thoughts of seeing Khe Sanh dominated my thoughts. Honestly, seeing Khe Sanh was both surreal and greatly fulfilling.  Strategically situated on high ground and beautiful green mountains, much of the former Marine base is gone. At present, the base is surrounded by seemingly endless coffee plantations and a small museum complete with disabled American military equipment straddling a dirt runway. However, the Vietnamese are slowly restoring the airstrip, including the runway and bunkers. With the stunning views, eerie war relics, and the biased exhibits – which were of course anticipated – Khe Sanh meet all of my expectations. I am definitely a war geek.

Hanoi Hilton

Hoa Lo Prison Entrance

Perhaps the most infamous site in all of Vietnam, at least for Americans, is the Hanoi Hilton (Hoa Lo Prison). Interesting side note, because Hoa Lo Prison is better known as the Hanoi Hilton, the local Hilton is called the Hanoi Hilton Opera. About half of the original prison remains, with much of the building demolished to clear space for a modern sky-rise building. Contrary to popular belief, most of the prison/museum focuses on the plight of the Viet Minh prisoners and the brutality of the French. Only two rooms are dedicated to the history the American pilots who spent time at the prison. It comes as no surprise that the museum presents an overly positive take on the treatment of American POWS. According to the museum, and official Communist Party history, all of the airmen imprisoned enjoyed good food, health, treatment, and leisure. This take is backed-up through staged Christmas pictures and images of John McCain’s return to Hanoi. What is missing of course are the images of malnourished and beaten prisoners as well as the testimonies of numerous Americans scared by the prison experiences.

Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum

Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum

Touching down in Hanoi was similar to the landings at Saigon and Da Nang. Air force hangers lined the runway, though this time they were not American built. My time in Hanoi coincided with the first of many ongoing demonstrations against the Chinese government. Since the Chinese believe they own the entire South China Sea, their warships cut Vietnamese undersea cables and shot at some fishing boats. Not taking this lightly, some Vietnamese, with permission from the Vietnamese government, protested outside of the Chinese embassy. Unfortunately for us, the Chinese embassy in the center of Hanoi. Consequently, we were unable to visit the military muesum. Fortunately, however, Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum remained open. Seeing a frozen Uncle Ho required navigating a large and impatient crowed. With numerous well dressed Vietnamese honor guards, order and safe were not an issue.  Ho Chi Minh looks like he did back in 1969, but that is probably because of the layers of make-up used to keep him from looking like a zombie.

Well that is all for now. As mentioned earlier, I will write about other aspects of my Vietnam trip. In the mean time, view the many photos I took.

Location of the longest war in American history where nearly 60 000 American lost their lives Vietnam has a long tradition of resistance to foreign powers seeking to influence its affairs.The Vietnamese achieved independence after 1 000 years of Chinese rule and in the 19th century endured over 80 years of French imperial domination before expelling them.Though much of the country is hilly and even mountainous rich agricultural land in the north and south are capable of feeding the populace… Lay of the Land Over 1 000 miles in length from north to south Vietnam forms the eastern edge of the Indochinese Peninsula in Southeast Asia.It is bordered by China to the north Laos and Cambodia to the west the Gulf of Thailand to the south and west and the South China Sea to the east. Vietnam has an area of 128 527 square miles slightly larger than the state of New Mexico or almost the size of Germany.

This just might be the best spam comment ever left on this site.  The spammer sure knows how to cram generic bits of Vietnam information into a single post.  Thank you observant spammer!

Another benefit of my participation in the Vietnam program includes expanding my knowledge of the country, which is invaluable to my development as a student of the Vietnam War and American foreign policy in Asia. Immersion in Vietnamese culture allows for a better understanding of the people and their history of the war with the US. Seeing the cultural sites, experiencing the people, and doing so with this particular group, would strengthen my familiarity with the subject.

Over the course of my trip I will certainly photograph as much as possible. Once I return, an assortment of images will be posted online. Maybe if I get lucky I will be able to upload some images with in country.

With this trip to Vietnam practically set in stone, Said will not win, as I will not be a so-called Orientalist. Now to leave you with something more humorous.

Despite more than two centuries of academic discourse, historians of the Civil War are still adding fresh works to the historiography.  Since the conclusion of the war, historians have sought a better understanding of the battles and generals.  Numerous historians have written on the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, including William Allan, Gary L. Ecelbarger, Robert K. Krick, and Robert G. Tanner.  The works of both Allan and Tanner, however, exhibit strong Confederate bias and thus give unfair assessments of the Union during the campaign.  Both Ecelbarger and Krick focused on battles and not the entire campaign.  In Shenandoah 1862, Cozzens adds balance to the debate and offers a sweeping reexamination of the campaign while avoiding bias by using both Confederate and Union primary sources (p. 2).  Central to Cozzens’ argument that Confederate General Thomas J. Jackson was not without imperfections, nor were the Union generals inept as often depicted in previous works.

Written in a narrative style, Shenandoah 1862 offers substantial insight into Jackson.  Throughout the work, Cozzens gives background information to provide a better understanding of Jackson’s thought processes.  In chapter one, when addressing Jackson’s religious views, Cozzens notes that Jackson’s strong faith allowed him to act comely in the heat of battle.  In doing so repeatedly, however, Cozzens drowns his arguments in a sea of narrative.

In his introduction, Cozzens argues that the significance of Jackson’s victories during the Shenandoah Valley Campaign “demonstrated that the Union armies and their commanders not only were not invincible, but also could be made to appear foolish through deft and daring maneuver” (p. 5).  The issue with this statement is that the Confederate victory at the battle of First Manassas in 1861 demonstrated the vulnerabilities of Union forces.  Consequently, the 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign can only reinforce what was already made evident a year earlier at Manassas.  Additionally, Cozzens undervalues the significance of First Manassas when stating that until Shenandoah, it had been a while since a Confederate victory.  While the victories during the Shenandoah Valley Campaign reinvigorated a Confederacy beset with recent defeats in the Western Theater, many Confederates remembered the triumph at Manassas a year earlier.

Several topics are of consequence to Cozzens’ work, most significantly the actions of Jackson and the failures of the opposing Union generals.  Regarding Jackson, Cozzens argues that the general’s strengths included a keen understanding of topography and the rapid movement of his forces to exploit enemy’s weaknesses.  Cozzens’ maintains, however, the Jackson’s quick troop marches left his men too drained to be useful during the latter stages of the campaign (p. 509-10).   Moreover, Jackson never shared his plans with his officers, thus leaving them bewildered in battle.

As for the Union, while previous historians contend that Abraham Lincoln’s generals were incompetent, Cozzens argues that the Federal command structure hindered their ability to meet the changing realities of a campaign.  Cozzens maintains that Lincoln’s discontent with events in Virginia lead to the president interfering in both the Shenandoah and Peninsular campaigns.  Concerns over the defense of Washington, resulted in Lincoln’s shuffling of troops from operations against Richmond to the hopeful destruction of Jackson’s forces in the Shenandoah Valley.   Cozzens notes that despite Federal meddling, Union generals conducted themselves well in the Shenandoah Valley.

Another issue with Cozzens’ work is that of citations.  Cozzens builds his work on a large primary and secondary source base.  While that is certainly a strength, the lack of citations for every quote is problematic.  For example, when quoting Jackson in the first paragraph on page 7, Cozzens does not provide any footnotes.  Further complicating the issue is that Cozzens uses many works on Jackson, thus it is impossible to match the uncited quotes with any particular source.  Another instance appears in the last paragraph on page 177, where Cozzens uses multiple quotations to relay a discussion of tactics between Colonel Nathan Kimball and Major General Harry G. Armstrong.  Again, it becomes difficult to attribute the quotations to a single source.

In sum, Cozzens offers a fair assessment of Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign.  While previous publications expresses strong Confederate bias, Cozzens addresses the shortcomings of all commanders, regardless of their affiliations.  Moreover, Cozzens provides substantial insight into how Jackson’s personal beliefs and military fortitude affected his leadership.  Despite some weaknesses, Cozzens demonstrates that fresh analysis of the Civil War are possible and indeed, valuable.

The motivations of Confederate soldiers have long been debated by scholars.  Before Kenneth W. Noe’s Reluctant Rebels, historians concentrated on the young men who joined the army shortly after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter.  Motivations for joining the war, argues war correspondent William Howard Russell, did not include ideological reasons such as politics and liberty.  In agreement, Gerald Linderman notes that men wanted, and were expected, to demonstrate their courage through battle.  Conversely, James McPherson contends that after Fort Sumter, men enlisted because they believed in the political ideology of the Confederacy.  These men saw the war as an extension of the American Revolution and were more than willing to fight for slavery and liberty.  Agreeing with McPherson, Randall Jimerson added that Confederates linked the protection of slavery with fighting for the defense of their homes and for liberty.  All of these scholars, however, based their findings on the men who joined the war in 1861.  Moreover, with scant evidence, scholars suggested that men joining the cause later on held different ideological views and were inferior soldiers.  Therefore, Noe seeks a nuanced understanding of the motivations, and abilities, of those who joined the army in 1862 and beyond.

Noe divides his work in three parts.  In part one, Noe addresses the ideological contention that men enlisted to defend their rights.  Noe argues that late enlisters wrote little of nationalism and were not worried about duty and honor.  Slavery, however, played a more significant role in that noticeably more post-1861 enlisters were son’s of slave holders.  Part two centers on the oversimplified assertion that Confederates only joined the army to protect their homes.  Here, Noe argues that young late enlisters were fueled by romanticism, while older men were concerned with defending their loved ones.  Part three examines the factors that caused men to enlist and what empowered them during the time in the army.  In this portion of his work, Noe concludes that the home maintained a strong presence in the lives of the soldiers.  Religion played a key role in connecting men with their homes and motivations to keep fighting, yet prevented larger group camaraderie.

To gain a nuanced understanding of the men who enlisted after 1861, Noe assembles a group of 320 men.  Through the use of census data, diaries, letters, and service records, Noe constructs a compelling rebuttal.  From these sources, Noe uncovers that these men were angered by the North’s hard hand of war and dwelt on the local ramifications of the conflict.  Moreover, these men were older and, generally, had backgrounds related to manual labor.  Noe’s statistical data suggests a clear connection between slavery and soldier motivations.  In his research, Noe finds that between thirty and forty percent of his sample were from slaveholding families.  Consequently, Noe demonstrates that these men had a stronger connection to slavery than the men who joined the army in 1861.  Additionally, Noe’s correlation between slavery and soldier motivations reflects a wider trend already suggested by Joseph Glatthaar in General Lee’s Army.  Nevertheless, Noe’s sample is far from perfect.  Not wanting to write “yet another study of white Southern elites,” Noe included those who where, and where not, literate.  Yet, as Noe acknowledges, this means his sample is “only suggestive at best for the entire population” (p. 13).  Futhermore, Noe excludes officers on the grounds that are more prosperous than enlisted men for fear that they would skew his data set (p. 16).  Consequently, Noe’s sample ignores men that could hinder his argument that men joining after 1861 were less ideologically motivated.

Contrary to earlier assessments that post-1861 soldiers were more likely to dessert and flee in battle, Noe uses his evidence base to argue that ultimately these late enlisters still “marched, fought, killed, and died for the Confederacy on dozens of battlefields” (p. 209).  Moreover, Noe adds that these men “were not cowards. Called upon to engage in combat, most seemingly fought to the best of their abilities” (p. 209).  Instead, Noe argues that these men were older and tired from hard work, thus combat exhausted them rather quickly.

Reluctant Rebels demonstrates the value of statistical evidence.  Despite issues over how Noe assembled his sample, his work remains valuable to the debate over Confederate soldier motivations.  Noe successful nuances preexisting arguments by explaining what many earlier works simply assumed, that being the traits of the enlisted solders after 1861.  It is Noe’s evidence that suggests that late enlisters where different from the men who joined the army in 1861, but they were certainly not inferior soldiers.

The rifle musket was once conceived as the reason for a prolonged and bloody Civil War. In The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat, Earl J. Hess endeavors to rewrite the history of the war’s most infamous firearm.  Historians and soldiers alike assumed the assertions of “pre-Civil War rifle enthusiasts with little alteration or questioning”  by accepting range of the rifle musket to be “anywhere from 250 to 1,000 yards” (p. 2-3).  Since the rifle musket’s range was claimed as superior to that of the smoothbore musket, scholars like James M. McPherson argue that despite the new rifle, soldiers continued to fight with outmoded tactics.  In addition to McPherson, Hess challenges the works of John Mahon in “Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics (Military Affairs, Summer 1961), and Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson in Attack and Die. These scholars advocated the “rifle revolution” theory, where the rifle musket’s longer killing range directly contributed to enormous causalities, the use of trenches, ineffective artillery and calvary attacks, and ultimately a protracted Civil War.  Citing Paddy Griffith’s Battle Tactics of the Civil War as the impetuous for his own work, Hess notes that Griffith found that most battles of 1863 and 1864 occurred between 127 and 141 yards.  Accordingly, Mark Grimsley and Brent Nosworthy reached similar numbers when examining the firing distances of the rifle musket (p. 7).  Adding to the debate, Hess argues that a combination of the rifle musket’s parabolic trajectory and combat within 100 yards on hilly terrain meant that the rifle musket was only slightly more lethal than its smoothbore predecessor.

Essentially, Hess seeks the termination of the “rifle revolution” theory.  To do so, Hess builds his work with the data compiled by other scholars as well as his own examination of archival documents, such as service records.  From this research, Hess argues that an increased effective range does not mean more casualties.  Rather, Hess notes that skirmishes typically occurred at a distance of 94.4 yards, which is an effective range for both rifle and smoothbore muskets.  Despite the potential of the rifle musket, soldiers were not trained to fire the weapon at longer distances.  Moreover, soldier’s were not well versed in trajectories of the rifle musket’s minie ball projectile.  Hess writes that when fired, the minie ball followed an arc-like trajectory, whereby the bullet passed through two killing areas.   Since soldiers did not consider the trajectory of the rifle musket, they did not adjust their aim when firing.  Thus all too often soldiers fired over the heads of the advancing enemy.

The rifle musket, asserts Hess, did alter Civil War tactics.  Since both Confederate and Union armies continued to fight with Napoleonic troop formations, Hess asserts that the impact of the rifle musket was restricted to skirmishing and sniping.  Nevertheless, Hess states that the rifle musket’s heightened effectives in “skirmishing was never a substitute for good fighting by the battle line” (p. 174).  Furthermore, Hess perceives the increased sniping range as having only a marginal affect on military operations (p. 196).

Along with the discussion of the combat effectiveness of the rifle musket, Hess address how soldiers came about acquiring weapons.  In his analysis of general orders, Hess finds that the Army of Tennessee lost 4,000 rifles simply from retreating soldiers (p. 46-7).  Although some troops simply abandon their rifles while in a hasty retreat, Hess uses the recollections of soldiers to suggest that some troops had the legitimate need to discard damaged firearms.  Additionally, Hess concludes that riflemen discarded their weapons in exchange for undamaged ones on the battlefield, with some did so when ammunition for their current rifle ran out (p. 48).

While Hess’s work deals serious damage to the “rifle revolution” thesis, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat is not perfect.  The majority of Hess’s evidence stems from the use of the rifle musket in the Western Theater.  Consequently, Hess’s data is perhaps more indicative of western battles than those of the Eastern Theater.  Another point of contention is that while Hess’s argues that soldiers were not trained to estimate distances accurately, the author accepts the purported firing ranges of soldiers without hesitation.  One should acknowledge the serious implications of soldier observations during the heat of battle.

Aside from the weakness in Hess’s work, the author has produced a noteworthy rebuttal to the works of previous historians.  Far from simply a study of the rifle musket, Hess’s examination demonstrates that technology alone does not win wars.  Therefore, Hess’s work ought to receive a warm reception from history buffs and Civil War scholars.

In Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II, Mark A. Stoler emphasizes the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in constructing American foreign policy during the Second World War.  In thirteen chapters, Stoler addresses the shift in U.S. civil-military relations that, as argued by the author, received limited discussion in the historiographical debate (xi).  The book begins with the prewar issues that preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, then covers the strategic debates of 1942 and 1943, and finally addresses the planning of the war’s endgame and Cold War policies.  Stoler maintains that despite the momentous shift in political power made possible by the 1947 National Security Act, the historiography has yet to explain how and why the JCS became a significant and permanent fixture in U.S. foreign policy.  For Stoler, the objective of Allies and Adversaries is to address these shortcomings.

According to Stoler, the political and geographic complexities of the Second World War necessitated the involvement of the JCS in diplomatic matters.  The author contends that President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not have much faith in the State Department.  Thus, the military presented itself as a logical replacement in foreign affairs.  Moreover, FDR favored his own policies and preferred an active role in wartime decisions, which resulted in the Chiefs reporting directly to the president.  Stoler notes that earlier on, the JCS cemented an influential relationship with the president and maintained it throughout Roosevelt’s presidency.

Stoler’s analysis of America’s “Europe First” decision sheds substantial light on difficult civil-military dilemmas confronting the JCS.  As noted by the author, the JCS had to deal with both American and British authorities when formulating wartime strategies.  The author argues that JCS smartly understood British interests to be shortsighted and self-serving (imperial preservation) and not useful in winning the war.¹  Instead, Stoler contends that the JCS focused on invading mainland Europe and confronting the expansive Japanese empire in the Pacific.  Yet U.S. military strategist argued over whether invading German occupied Europe was more imperative than a war in the Pacific.  Some argued that focusing on the Japanese threat would prevent Japan from attacking the USSR.  Nevertheless, the Germans were ultimately seen as the more direct and active threat against the Soviet Union.  As quoted by Stoler, Roosevelt stated that “the whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians,” thus after eliminating the Germans, “we can defeat the Japanese in six weeks” (85). Essentially, the author emphasizes that an Allied victory rested on keeping the Russians in the war.  Despite his assertion that a major objective of American strategy centered on keeping the Soviets in the war, Stoler does not thoroughly address the delay in the invasion of occupied France (123).

To support his arguments, Stoler uses a wide range of diplomatic and military records, as well as the personal papers of influential members of the U.S. government and armed services.  The author’s emphasis on the importance of keeping the USSR in the war should force all subsequent historiographical debates on the Second World War to reexamine America’s wartime partnership with the Russians.  Ultimately, all readers will appreciate Stoler’s effort and will acquire a deepened understanding of the rise of the JCS as a dominate force in U.S. postwar foreign policy.

In War Without Mercy, John W. Dower examines the confluence of racism and war making that empowered the ideologies of both the United States and Japan during the Pacific War.  Before Dowers work, most studies of racism and hatred during the Second World War focus on the Holocaust.  Additionally, the major works on the war between the U.S. and Japan, such as Ronald Spector’s Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan (1984), gave little attention to topics of race and ideology.  Therefore, Dower’s groundbreaking book challenges the ways in which scholars analyze wars between the Western world and Asia.  Dower identifies what he sees as the prevailing trends – widespread racism and abhorrence of the enemy, – driving American and Japanese fighting during the Pacific War.  For Dower, then, it is necessary to explain how “abstractions” like “war words and graphic images” became tangible through poor military intelligence, acts of barbarism, and the implementation of “exterminations policies” (x).  Moreover, the author is concerned with the ramifications of such brutal warfare.  Rather, after years of deep seeded hostility, how did the United States and Japan make amends so easily?  Dower concludes that while racism drove both nations during the Second World War, Cold War politics, especially Soviet Communism, hastened the reconciliation process and cemented the current partnership between the U.S. and Japan (310).

Racism, argues Dower, took on different forms for the Americans and Japanese.  For the U.S., the emergence of a powerful Japanese empire challenged long-standing beliefs of white supremacy (5-6).  Regarding the Japanese, the author contends that Japan took its racial superiority for granted (5). Despite claims from the Japanese government that the island nation was fighting for colonized Asians, this Pan-Asian unity was a myth.  The Japanese were just as, or even more, aggressive than Westerners towards other Asians (7).  In terms of viewing one another, Dower argues that both the U.S. and Japan allowed prejudice and racial stereotypes to permeate their understanding of each other’s military capabilities.  Moreover such misconceptions allowed for “Race hate fed atrocities, and atrocities in turn fanned the fires of race hate” (11).  Furthermore, the dehumanization of the enemy at both the command and frontline levels resulted in emotional and mental distancing that allowed soldiers to kill repeatedly.  Combined with the deeply embedded racial hatred, the desensitization of troops made the Pacific War more savage than Europe.

Much of Dower’s work rests on the examination of propaganda, particularly cartoons, films, novels, and official government publications.  Through these sources, both the U.S. and Japan sought to establish the other as subhuman.  The Americans used such propaganda to portray the Japanese as barbarous racists bent on the destruction of civilization.  Often, the Japanese were depicted as animals, usually monkeys, insects, and reptiles.  Conversely, according to the author, the Japanese presented the Allies as corrupt demonic beings that threatened Japanese purity.  Yet despite Dower’s masterful use of propaganda, much of his work is American-centric in that discussions of Japan are noticeably shorter than those of America.  Moreover, the absence of oral histories is troubling.  If the race hate between the two enemies was as ferocious as Dower maintains, than the memories of both American and Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen would reinforce the author’s central thesis.

War Without Mercy challenges the historiography to address issues of race, not only in the Pacific War, but also in all wars.  The conclusions of Dower, while pertinent to America’s war with Japan, are exceedingly applicable to the Vietnam War.  In sum, Dower offers a valuable work on the racial and ideological aspects of war making.