Besides the study of battles and the conduct of the war, recent Civil War historiography emphasizes the lives of contemporary women.  In Gender and the Sectional Conflict, Nina Silber dedicates three short chapters in which she argues that the role of gender is integral to understanding Civil War ideology and memory.  While building on Drew Gilpen Faust’s Mothers of Invention, Silber synthesis directly connects the arguments put forth in her previous work, The Romance of Reunion, with the studies of LeeAnn Whites and David Blight.  According to Silber, Whites argues in her 1992 essay that scholars should strive to understand the Civil War as a gender struggle (xii).  This argument caused Silber to reexamine her previous research by including men and women, which in turn allows the author to analyze the ideology of both northerners and southerners.  Furthermore, Blight’s Race and Reunion emphasizes the postwar connection between race and America’s quickness to forget issues of slavery and emancipation.  Adding to Blight’s work, Silber contends that gender allowed the nation to concentrate on the home and ignore links to issues of race (xix).  In essence, Silber focuses on how women from both the Union and Confederacy shaped the rational behind waging the Civil War as well as their involvement during the war, and after, the conflict.

The ideological arguments provided by Southerners and Northerners for going to war is central to Silber’s first chapter.  Sibler contends that Confederates fused the need to defend their nation with the more crucial duty of protecting their families.  As noted by Silber, for Confederate men, “while the nation may have been a cause worth fighting for, it meant nothing in the absence of homes and families” (xiv).  In contrast, Silber argues that Unionists understood the need to secure a positive future for their family as more vital than their current well being (xv).   Put another way, Silber states “If Confederate soldiers fought for ‘home,’ Union men very clearly—and more self-consciously—fought for ‘country’” (13).

Mid-war patriotism of women provides the focal point of Silber’s second chapter.  Silber finds that Union and Confederate women differed in how they shaped the nations ideological rational for going to war.  During the war, Silber contends that southern women upheld contemporary ideals of gender.  To support the Confederacy, southern women gave aid to soldiers because these men were defending the institutions of the home and womanhood.  Northern women, however, found themselves at the center of the Union debate over issues of class and antiwar sentiment.  In the North, many writers used women to question whether the working class bled more than the elites for the Union.  Silber argues that to silence critics,  northern women were more inclined to associate support for the war as loyalty to the Union and thus were open to developing political opinions not entirely inline with those of northern men.

The discussion of the Civil War’s legacy dominates chapter three.  In this chapter, Silber address the role women played in shaping postwar memory.  The burial of war dead affected how northern and southern women participated in the shaping of memory.  Since the federal government handled the interment of Union dead, northern women were invisible to the public.  Silber does note, however, that northern women concerned themselves with helping needy veterans.  In contrast, southern women were heavily involved in the burying of Confederate dead, which many women used to demonstrate their allegiance to the family, and more significantly, the defense of the Confederacy.  Consequently, southern women became an indispensable component of the romanticizing of the Lost Cause.  Silber maintains that northerners concluded that defending the Republic “was ultimately men’s business, not women’s, and it was a business that lacked the sentimental and feminine influences that surrounded the Lost Cause” (88).  Using both primary and secondary sources, Silber develops a valuable synthesis on the study of gender during the Civil War.  Although most of Silber’s sources emerge from recent scholarship, her work is certainly not any less significant.  Additionally, despite the brevity of Gender and the Sectional Conflict, Silber successfully combines the arguments of Whites and Blight with her own research, thus providing a holistic understanding of the current historiography.   Ultimately, Silber’s work forces historians to reexamine Civil War constructions of gender in terms of patriotism and memory.

Traditionally, historians portrary both the First and Second Vietnam Wars as American lead wars against communism.  In The First Vietnam War, editors Mark Atwood Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall provide a collection of articles to argue the origins of the Vietnam Wars lay in the Viet Minh’s fight against French colonial rule.  The collection reminds academia that the Vietnam War was more a product of anti-colonialism, rather than the spread of Soviet communism.  Moreover, the collection illustrates that the conflicts in Vietnam were not domestic, but rather events with international ramifications.  Chapters by Lawrence and John Prados are paramount in addressing how a French problem in Indochina became an American war.

Mark Atwood Lawrence raises one of the more significant arguments in chapter six, where he examines the role Great Britain in encouraging American support for France during the First Vietnam War.  Lawrence argues that Britain and France shared a common interest in preventing the disintegration of their colonial empires, thus both were willing crush colonial uprisings.  Britain did not want the war in Vietnam to encourage rebellion in places like India and Malaya, thus Britain saw a French victory in Indochina as a triumph for all colonial powers.  Since the Second World War had left both Britain and France militarily weak, the US was seen as an invaluable partner in the defense of European colonial empires.  Recognizing America’s dislike for European colonialism, Lawrence maintains that Britain helped recast the war in Vietnam as struggle against the spread of communism.  Lawrence notes that while the British government pressed the US to carry the financial burden of funding the French war, Britain offered meager monetary and military assistance.  Lawrence’s work demonstrates that even after the Second World War, Britain continued its tradition of using other nations to achieve foreign interests.  Ironically, once Britain granted independence to India and other colonies, England lost interest in supporting the war in Vietnam.

In chapter eleven, orthodox scholar John Prados emphasizes Frances reliance on the US for the war in Indochina.  Focusing on Dien Bien Phu, Prados argues that the French changed the reason for being in Vietnam from a war of colonial preservation to a fight against communism.  At the time of Dien Bien Phu, French public support for the war was waning. Conversely, the US became increasingly more involved in Indochina.  For President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the war in Vietnam had indeed become a struggle against international communism.  With the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Eisenhower administration had proof that communism could spread across Southeast Asia.  Moreover, the Eisenhower administration understood that America could not rely on other nations to win the war against communist expansion.  Consequently, Prados argues that with Eisenhower’s “Domino Theory,” America was enamored in the Cold War ideology of fighting communism.

In sum, The First Vietnam War emphasizes the colonial origins of the Vietnam War.  With so much attention placed on how Vietnam became a Cold War battleground, historians failed to adequately discuss place Vietnam in a colonial context.  Consequently, The First Vietnam War is a valuable addition to the discourse on both the Vietnam War and post-Second World War world.

All too often scholars present the Vietnam War as a product of the Cold War, whereby ignoring the conflict’s colonial origins.  In Imaging Vietnam and America, orthodox historian Mark Philip Bradley examines how the Viet Minh and Americans perceived one another.  For the Viet Minh, America’s Founding Fathers expressed an ideology that supported Vietnamese independence.  As a result, Bradley maintains that Viet Minh conceptions of the United States were dominated by the rhetoric of the American Revolution.  Conversely, racial stereotypes shaped America’s opinion of Vietnam.  Noting the link between postcolonial Vietnam and America’s colonial past, Bradley acknowledges a shared desire for liberty.  Additionally, Bradley contends that because of common ideology, war between the two civilizations would seem impossible.  Throughout his work, however, Bradley argues that a common appreciation for self-determinism was insufficient in cementing an alliance between Viet Minh and the U.S..

Most of the historiography contends, that although America backed the Viet Minh during the Japanese occupation of Indochina, over time the U.S. lost interest in the relationship.  Bradley argues that the historiography suggests that America chose to support French claims to Vietnam out of respect, and Cold War interests in Europe, rather than recognize a free Vietnam.  Challenging these arguments, the author addresses the relationship between Vietnam and the U.S. as one founded on misconceptions and suspicions.

Bradley makes use of his strong background in Vietnam studies by demonstrating the relationship between Vietnam and America through Vietnamese primary sources.  Bradley’s mastery of Vietnamese literature allows him to access the underlying attitudes of the Vietnamese, French, and Americans.  For Bradley, the Vietnamese understanding of Americans was rather limited.  In part to isolation and limited media outlets, most Vietnamese understood American purely in the context of men like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington.  Bradley notes that Ho Chi Minh connected with America’s Founding Fathers and used their words to invoke Vietnamese independence.  Moreover, to fuse with American ideology, Ho Chi Minh used portions of America’s Declaration of Independence in his proclamation of a free Vietnamese state.

While most diplomatic histories are topdown studies, Bradley centers on the intangible popular political sentiments.  Consequently, Bradley demonstrates that Orientalism dominated American perceptions of the Vietnamese.  For example, although the CIA noted the determination of the Viet Minh to achieve self rule, in reports, agents emphasized the inferiorities of Asian peoples.  Bradley contends America doubted the ability of Ho Chi Minh to rule without Soviet assistance.  Combined with such stereotypes and the intensification of the Cold War, US policy makers ultimately questioned the Viet Minh’s nationalist ideology.

In sum, Bradley offers a fresh analysis of the relationship between postcolonial Vietnam and America.  In doing so, Bradley advocates that both nations developed faulty perceptions of one another.  Despite some commonalities, ideological and racial stereotypes distorted the mindsets of both the Viet Minh and American policy makers.

When one thinks about America and imperialism, all too often the name Theodore Roosevelt comes to mind. In Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context, Richard H. Collin argues against the popularized image of Theodore Roosevelt as a staunch imperialist. Collin asserts that this belief, long advocated by Latin American writers, loses sight of Roosevelt’s main stance against European interference in Latin American affairs. Rather than being an imperialist, Roosevelt stood for the exclusion of Europe, not the subjection of Latin America (ix). While Latin Americans altered the legacy of Roosevelt and late 19th-Century U..S foreign policy, Collin’s accuses the historiography as focusing on over simplistic arguments, such as Frederick Marks III’s assertion in Velvet to Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt that Roosevelt was a virtuous man. For Collin, Caribbean contexts outweigh arguments centered on Roosevelt (xv). Thus Collin’s work is an examination of how nations, such as Columbia and Venezuela, exhibited agency in their dealings with the major contemporary European powers and the United States.

Central to Collin’s work is the argument that modernism, not the U.S., was the enemy of Latin America (9). Rather, a negative portrayal of the U.S. was a convenient means for Latin Americans to place the blame over Latin America’s struggles on the Americans. Additionally, issues with entering the industrialized world spurred dynamic changes for Latin America. An example used by Collin is that of sugar. With the advent of new technologies, the production of sugar was no longer limited to the Caribbean (34). Supporting that overarching argument is the assertion that Roosevelt opposed the expansion of one nation at the expense of another. Collin states that Roosevelt strongly believed in the concepts of independence and civilization, and thus the mixing of different cultural groups would sully those ideals (52). Consequently, instead of supporting imperialist actions, Roosevelt looked down on the “sleazy” dealings of American entrepreneurs in Central and South America (11).

Latin American agency in international affairs resonates throughout Collin’s work. Demonstrating an active Latin America is the case of Venezuela and Great Britain. Collin argues that Venezuela and Britain wrangled over the avoidance of each others taxes, with the South American nation arresting British nationals that were suspected of circumventing trade laws. The dispute escalated when France used military force to free jailed citizens in Venezuela, with Britain taking note of the effectiveness of such actions. Together with Germany, Britain assembled a naval armada to force Venezuela to the negotiating table. Fearful of a joint British and German invasion of South America, the U.S. stationed a large fleet off Puerto Rico. The American show of force helped pressure the Europeans to accept arbitration and allow the disintegrating German and British alliance to save face (106-107).

Another example of Latin American agency persists in America’s relationship with Columbia. Collin argues that during Columbia’s civil war, conservative Columbian leader Jose Manuel Marroquin manipulated the United States. Marroquin promised the U.S. rights to build a canal through Panama, granted that the American’s helped end his nations civil war. The Columbian leader used U.S. intervention to undermine the power of his liberal opponents in Panama. With the war leaving Columbia destitute, the U.S. dumped much capital into the nation in hopes that Marroquin would finally sanction the construction of a canal in Panama. Despite America’s ability to diplomatically end the conflict, Marroquin reneged on his end of the deal. Thus, Collin contends that Columbia forced America’s hand and thus the U.S. ultimately supported Panamanian independence (267-277).

In Theodore Roosevelt’s Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context readers will be exposed to two significant arguments. Under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, the US stood with Latin America against European imperialism and various Latin American nations were active participants in late 19th-Century internal affairs. Collin’s arguments are supported by a deep pool of primary and secondary sources. Readers will appreciate the author’s extensive use of archival sources from the U.S. and Latin America. Ultimately, Collin adds an invaluable component to the historiography of U.S. foreign relations.

Besides the discussions related to my research interests, this years SMH gave me a better understanding of how to present a paper.  Through the various panels, it became clear that powerpoints are only as good as the presenter and a paper based on generalities will put many people to sleep.  Moreover, my belief that if one is going to ask a question it better be amazing and relevant.  Sometimes is pays to be quiet and take notes.

In sum, I enjoyed the conference and am looking forward to the next SMH.  Additionally, I hope to present some research next summer.

At present, I am not certain as an exact dissertation topic. Having always been interested in the relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth, I am contemplating a dissertation that would examine how the armed forces of America and Australia interacted prior to, and during, the Vietnam War. Granted that a fair amount of literature covers such a topic, I hope further reading will afford me a better understanding of issues that require additional analysis. In between many summer commitments, I hope to read-up on Australia in the Vietnam War so that by the fall I will have a more refined dissertation topic.

This semester I am taking a course solely on the Vietnam War. Incidentally, this is my first true post-Second World War American history course. Needless to say my understanding of the Cold War era leaves a lot to be desired. All of that aside, my escalating interest in Vietnam might cause me to shift my Civil War to Second World War focus to one that encompasses America’s more modern conflicts. The World Wars onwards might be a better focus simply because of the amount of literature that needs to be written. That realization has started to make me wonder what would happen if my interest in the Vietnam war led to changing my dissertation topic to one that dealt with some aspect of America’s turbulent foray into Southeast Asia. At present the idea of centering on 20th Century warfare seems far less drastic and would allow for my Great War topic.

Granted I have comps to worry about first, I still find it prudent to ponder these questions before I start asking certain professors to join my committee. For instance, if I shift to a more modern topic it would help to have professors whose strengths lie in Cold War-era topics. Alternatively, perhaps I just worry too much! Any outside thoughts and suggestions are welcome.

1. It helps to be as organized as possible. Losing syllabuses halfway through the semester must be avoided. Aside from the misplacing of syllabi, it would be beneficial to create a list of all assignments and their respective due dates. This technique can be attributed to a colleague of mine who demonstrated throughout the semester just how magnificent this method of consolation helps one keep track of the numerous papers due in multiple classes.
2. While a centralized list of assignments goes a long way in managing one’s time more efficiently, one must plan out and complete those tasks with enough time left for proper revisions and edits to be made. Consequently, having to write a couple papers over the course of a single weekend could be avoided if one planned ahead.
3. Be more confident in you reading abilities. While taking notes on the material is important, being able to express your understanding of the literature to professors is invaluable.

Again, these are just some suggestions on how to improve my academic performance while preserving my sanity. As always, outside input is welcome.

Shortcomings in the existing literature furnish an opportunity to broaden and deepen our understanding of the Meuse-Argonne offensive as well as other engagements. While little work is being done on the AEF, other First World War fields are generating new interest. Recent assessments of First World War  scholarship, for example, have underscored the need for studies on the Imperial German Army’s non-Prussian units. Certainly, such research needs to be conducted, but there is also a need for similar analysis of the AEF. Dr. Groteleuschen noted that the Field Artillery serves as an example of good American branch level doctrine and battlefield performance. Such an approach can also be applied to the study of other important branches of the AEF. This observation was supported by my research, in which I argued that the Coast Artillery Corps played a crucial role in the development of a mobile heavy artillery arm of the AEF, a conclusion reached without benefit of any major works on the subject. A thorough study on the heavy artillery arm of the AEF should be a major component of the revitalization of the field. As a result, I wish to explore the impact of AEF heavy artillery on the First World War, with possible emphasis on the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.